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announcement premium is large, robust, and strongly related to the fact that volume surges around
announcement dates.  Stocks with high past announcement period volume earn the highest announcement
premium, suggesting some common underlying cause for both volume and the premium.  We show
that high premium stocks experience the highest levels of imputed small investor buying, suggesting
that the premium is driven by buying by small investors when the announcement catches their attention.
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The relation between trading volume and prices in asset markets is not well understood.  
In the purest neoclassical model with homogenous agents, prices adjust with no trading at all.  
Risk-based rational asset pricing models attempt to explain expected returns without attempting 
to explain volume.  In this paper, we study the connection between volume and prices by 
studying regularly scheduled quarterly earnings announcements made by firms.  As is well 
known, these announcements cause both substantial price volatility and substantial increases in 
volume.  In addition, stock prices on average rise in the days around earnings announcements.  
This earnings announcement premium has been known at least since Beaver (1968) and has since 
been studied by Chari et al (1988), Ball and Kothari (1991), and Cohen et al (2005).   
In this paper, we make two contributions.  First, we provide evidence on the magnitude 
and robustness of the earnings announcement premium.  We show that the premium is a 
substantial anomaly: we find monthly strategies earning excess returns of between 7% and 18% 
per year, with Sharpe ratios larger than other popular anomalies.  The premium is strong in large 
capitalization stocks, is not only confined to the three-day window around the announcement, 
and appears consistently since 1927.  Second, we provide an explanation for the premium.  We 
hypothesize that the predictable rise in stock price is driven by the predictable rise in volume 
around earnings announcements.  We test this volume hypothesis and show that the premium is 
strongly related to the concentration of past trading activity around earnings announcement 
dates.  In particular, stocks with high volume around earnings announcements have subsequently 
both high premiums and high imputed buying by individual investors.  This finding suggests that 
for some stocks, prices are pushed higher around announcement dates by buying pressure from 
individuals. 
On average, as noted in Karpoff (1987) among others, stock returns and trading volume  
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tend to be positively correlated.  Stocks tend to rise on high volume and decline on low volume.  
One can see the earnings announcement premium as a special case of this pattern: when volume 
is (predictably) high, returns are (predictably) high.  There are now many theories to explain why 
high volume should lead to high prices.  Many of these theories involve short-sale constraints 
(although often these models are static and cannot address time-varying levels of volume).  
Under short sale constraints, differences of opinion lead to overpricing (see Miller (1977) and 
Harrison and Kreps (1978)).  To the extent that greater differences of opinion lead to more 
trading volume, higher volume indicates greater overpricing (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), 
Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005)).  One explanation for the high volume around earnings 
announcements is differences of opinion about the meaning of the announcements (see Kandel 
and Pearson (1995)).  Thus one possible story for the earnings announcement premium is that 
differences of opinion increase around earnings announcements, leading to a rise in price.  One 
could imagine building a model to explain the premium using rational investors with time-
varying disagreement. 
Another strand of explanations for the correlation of volume and returns involves 
irrational or random traders.  In Baker and Stein (2004), high trading volume indicates the 
presence of irrational traders who push up prices (their model also involves short sale 
constraints).  In Hong and Yu (2006), high volume indicates the presence of noise traders, and 
risk-averse rational traders demand a risk premium to compensate for the sentiment risk.  Our 
paper is related to Hong and Yu (2006) in that they study aggregate seasonal patterns in stock 
market volume and returns, while we study stock-specific seasonal patterns due to earnings 
announcements.  Heston and Sadka (2005) also look at stock-specific seasonals in prices and 
volume, although they show their results are not driven by earnings announcements.  
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A specific story involving irrational or cognitively constrained investors is the "attention-
grabbing" hypothesis of Lee (1992) and Barber and Odean (2004).  According to this hypothesis, 
individual investors both have limited attention, and rarely sell short.  When a stock which they 
currently do not own grabs their attention, these individual investors are more likely to buy the 
stock (compared to a stock which does not grab their attention).  Institutional investors are less 
attention constrained.  Thus the attention-grabbing hypothesis predicts that individual investors 
are likely to be net buyers of any stock in the news, whether the news is good or bad.  Barber and 
Odean (2004) show that stocks in the news have both high volume and high net buying by 
individuals.  Further, they show that these stocks subsequently underperform, suggesting that 
individual investors pushed up prices too high (or prevented prices from falling sufficiently) in 
response to the news (see also Seasholes and Wu (2005)).  The attention-grabbing hypothesis 
explains why high volume is associated with high returns.  Gervais et al (2001) have a similar 
explanation for the relation between high volume today and high returns over the near future.   
Thus there are many theories, not mutually exclusive, explaining why volume and returns 
might be contemporaneously correlated.  The benefit of using earnings announcements is that 
they are frequent events, exogenously occurring, generating substantial volume, and scheduled at 
known intervals.  Thus they provide a good laboratory for testing whether volume drives returns, 
and specifically whether predictable volume generates predictable returns.   
We focus on testing the attention-grabbing hypothesis.  Consistent with the hypothesis, 
Lee (1992), Hirshleifer et al. (2004), and Dey and Radhakrishna (2006) show that individual 
investors trade heavily and are net buyers on earnings announcements, no matter whether the 
news is good or bad. Similarly, Kandel and Pearson (1995) show that volume rises on earnings 
announcements for good news, bad news, and also in cases where prices don't move much (no  
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news). The attention-grabbing hypothesis predicts that around earnings announcements, prices 
rise too much (or fall too little) in response to information released, due to buying by individual 
investors.   
When presented with any anomaly, there are two questions one should ask.  First, what is 
causing the anomaly? Second, why haven't arbitrageurs eliminated the anomaly? In this paper, 
we attempt to answer the first question, but not the second (see Cohen et al.  (2005) for an 
investigation of the second question).  We can however make two comments on this issue.  First, 
there are some obvious limits to arbitrage.  Frequent trading is required, thus incurring 
substantial trading costs.  There is high idiosyncratic volatility around earnings announcements, 
which could deter traders who for some reason are unable to sufficiently diversify.  As we will 
show, one type of explanation we certainly can rule out is systematic risk as traditionally 
defined.  If idiosyncratic risk is somehow preventing arbitrage activity, then in this limited sense 
one can say the premium is reward for bearing risk.   
Second, we present evidence suggesting that arbitrageurs are trading to eliminate the 
premium.  We show that prior to the announcement there are high imputed buys from large 
investors. One interpretation is that arbitrageurs are aware of the anomaly, are trading on it, but 
have not yet completely eliminated it (see also Baker, Litov, and Wurgler (2004) for evidence of 
sophisticated investor trading around earnings announcements). 
This paper is organized as follows.  In section I, we provide a description of earnings 
announcements and data.  In section , we show the magnitude and robustness of the earnings 
announcement premium.  In section III, we document the connection between volume and the 
premium.  In section IV, we examine in more detail the attention-grabbing hypothesis and look 
at variables measuring retail investor trading.  Section V presents conclusions.  
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I.  Earnings announcements 
A.  Announcement dates 
Publicly traded US firms are required to file quarterly earnings reports at legally specified 
intervals.  Filing deadlines depend on the fiscal year-end of the company.  Our source for 
earnings announcements dates is Compustat, which claims to report the date that the earnings 
report appears in the Wall Street Journal or newswire services.  The first earnings announcement 
available on Compustat is December 1970.  Since coverage is incomplete in the early years, we 
start in 1972.  Our final sample includes all common stocks traded in CRSP between January 
1972 and December 2004.  In what follows, we will usually require a previous year of 
announcements in order to predict the announcement date for this year.  Thus we will look at 
returns in the period 1973 to 2004 (and for NASDAQ firms, we will start in 1974 since 1973 is 
the first full year of NASDAQ in CRSP/Compustat merged database).   
Compustat's data on earnings announcement is incomplete, especially for small firms in 
the early part of the sample.  Panel A of Table I shows the coverage for 1973 (our first year), 
1974 (the first year including NASDAQ), 2004 (our last year), and the entire sample.  Over the 
full sample, only 68% of all firm-years contain the required four announcements.  The coverage 
of earnings announcement rises from 50% in 1974 to 95% in the final year.  In the last three 
columns we show coverage of earnings announcements for smaller and larger firms as well as 
the percentage of market capitalization of firms with exactly four announcements in the calendar 
year.   
The coverage is often incomplete for small stocks, especially in the early years.  We 
conjecture that this is due the fact that news sources are more likely to report earnings 
announcements for big stocks.  In most of the empirical analysis we require stocks to have at  
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least 4 announcements in the previous year, hence after this filter is applied our basic sample 
includes 68% of CRSP common stocks or 96% in terms of market capitalization.   
Panel B shows the distribution of announcements and fiscal year-ends by calendar month.  
Most firms (62%) have December fiscal year-ends, and many others have March, June, and 
September year ends.  These seasonalities in fiscal years produce seasonalities in earnings 
announcements, since announcement deadlines are linked to fiscal year-ends.  Most of the 
announcing activity is concentrated in the months of January, February, April, July and October 
(these months account for about 66% of announcements).  Nevertheless each month has a 
sufficiently large number of earnings announcements such that when we later form portfolios 
based on scheduled announcements, we will have sufficiently diversified portfolios in each 
month. 
B.  Actual dates versus expected dates 
In order to test whether firms earn a predictable premium around their announcement 
dates, it is necessary to use only public information known in real time.  Although precise 
scheduled announcement dates are often known in advance by market participants, sometimes 
announcements are early, late, or cancelled.  This timing can contain information (for example, a 
delayed announcement date might convey bad news).  Thus one cannot use actual announcement 
dates, but rather must construct a proxy for expected announcements dates (a point emphasized 
by Cohen et al (2005)).   
Prior accounting literature has used various models for forecasting earnings 
announcement dates focusing mainly on a three-day widow around the announcement (Givoly 
and Palmon (1982), Chambers and Penman (1984), Begley and Fisher (1998), Cohen et al.  
(2005)).  For the purpose of our analysis we are not interested in generating high frequency  
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expected announcement dates; instead, we use monthly data and expected announcement months 
(we explain our focus on monthly, not daily, portfolios in the next section). 
We use two simple algorithms to forecast announcement months.  The first method is 
based on historical announcement months: we simply use the previous year's announcement 
month.  For example, if firm XYZ had an announcement in March 1997, we expect it to have an 
announcement in March 1998.   
The second algorithm is based on the firm’s fiscal year end.  As seen in Table I, there are 
obvious seasonalities in the timing of the announcement related to a firm’s fiscal year end.  We 
use the historical distribution of announcement months and fiscal year-ends to construct expected 
announcement months based on the firm’s fiscal year end.  For example, firms with fiscal year 
ending in October tend to announce in February, May, June and December: therefore, if firm 
ZYX has a fiscal year ending in October, we expected it to announce its earnings in February, 
May, June and December.  We report a detailed explanation of the algorithm in the appendix.  
This second approach has the methodological advantage that one can construct reasonably 
accurate proxies for announcement months by looking just at the month end of the fiscal year of 
the company.  This variable changes rarely and is thus much easier to collect than precise 
announcement dates, which are only available in COMPUSTAT over the period 1971-2004.  
Thus using this algorithm allows us to make inference based a longer sample period, producing 
more reliable estimates. 
In Table II we summarize the performance of the two forecasting algorithms by reporting 
the fraction of earnings announcements that are released on expected months.  We require firms 
to have at least 12 months of prior return data from CRSP to be included in the table.  In the top 
panel we report results for the full sample while in the bottom panel we show results by firm  
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size.
1  Overall, the results show that we can predict with a high degree of accuracy the 
announcement month.  In our entire sample, using last year's announcement months as a proxy, 
80% of the announcements are in the expected announcement month; looking at the universe of 
firms with at least 4 earnings announcements in the previous calendar year raises the accuracy of 
the algorithm to 93%.  For the fiscal year method, this number is 73%, lower but still 
respectable.  Panel B shows that the accuracy of predicted announcements months increases in 
firm size.   
To summarize, a highly accurate way of predicting announcement months is to use last 
year's announcement month and restrict the sample to firms with four announcements in the 
previous year.  Less accurate, but still informative, is simply using the firm's fiscal year end to 
predict announcement months. 
II.  The earnings announcement premium 
In this paper we focus on portfolio returns in calendar months.  Thus the strategy we 
explore is as follows.  On the last trading day of month t-1, buy every stock expected to 
announce earnings in month t, and short every stock not expected to announce.  Hold this 
portfolio until the last day of month t, then form a new portfolio for the next month.   
We focus on monthly returns for four reasons.  First, since our interest is in expected 
announcement returns, it is convenient to have a wide window around the specific day to 
increase the chance that we are buying before the announcement and selling after the 
announcement.  This wide window also helps avoid the inaccuracies of Compustat data.  Since 
the Compustat date sometimes comes from the Wall Street Journal (appearing the day after the 
announcement) and sometimes from newswires (appearing the day of the announcement), and 
since announcements can occur before, during, or after trading hours, pinning down the precise  
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date is difficult.  Second, we wish to calculate returns that do not reflect short-term asymmetric 
information and changes in liquidity around announcement dates.  By using monthly returns, we 
are using a strategy that on average buys two weeks before the expected announcement and sells 
two weeks after, thus avoiding issues of liquidity on the exact announcement day.  Third, 
monthly returns are a familiar unit for financial economists and allow easy comparison to 
existing patterns.  Fourth, as we show later, looking at a 3-day window around the announcement 
date misses much of the premium.  Prior to the announcement day, there is a substantial pre-
event run-up, as well as a positive drift after the announcement.  Thus a 20-day window is more 
informative than a 3-day window. 
A.  Average premium, 1973-2004 
Table III summarize the earnings premium.  We form calendar time portfolios based on 
whether or not a firm is expected to have an announcement this month, using last year's 
announcement month as the method for forecasting announcement dates.  We examine monthly 
returns of the value weighted portfolio of firms expected to announce as well as returns on the 
value weighted portfolio on firms not expected to announce.  Thus we are testing for the 
existence of an unconditional announcement effect: we are asking whether all firms tend to go up 
in expected announcement months.  We also form a long-short portfolio, where every firm in the 
sample goes into the long portfolio four months out of the year and into the short portfolio eight 
months out of the year.  We restrict the sample to firms which have had exactly 4 earnings 
announcements in the previous 12 calendar months.  For comparison, we also show the value 
weighted market portfolio for this sample of firms.   
Table III shows that there is large and significant announcement premium.  In months in 
which stocks are expected to announce earnings, stock returns are higher than in months in  
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which no announcement is scheduled.  The long-short portfolio generates returns of 61 basis 
points per month (or about 7% per year) with a t-statistic over 5.  One can immediately see from 
Table III that the CAPM cannot explain the announcement premium (see also Ball and Kothari 
(1991)).  The CAPM predicts the market portfolio has the highest possible Sharpe ratio.  Table 
III shows that a portfolio of expected announcers has a Sharpe ratio 60% higher than the market 
and 170% higher than a portfolio of expected non-announcers.  The long-short portfolio (which 
hedges out market risk) has a Sharpe ratio 136% higher than the market.  The portfolio of 
expected announcers has a much higher mean than the market, but only slightly higher variance.  
Announcement month volatility is largely idiosyncratic and diversifies away in portfolios 
holding many stocks (the portfolio of expected announcers always contains at least 161 firms in 
each month up to a maximum of 2945 firms).  Table III also shows that the portfolio of expected 
announcers does not look especially risky measured by skewness or kurtosis.    
Table IV further examines systematic risk factors.  Since every firm is going in and out of 
the long portfolio every four months, risks that are associated with characteristics of stocks are 
unlikely to explain the premium.  For example, it is unlikely that the long portfolio overweights 
value stocks or high beta stocks, since every stock rotates in and out of the portfolio every 
quarter.  Thus, not surprisingly, Table IV shows the earnings announcement return is essentially 
unrelated to market risk or to any of the other factors commonly used in asset pricing.  We 
regress the calendar time portfolio return on the earnings announcement strategy on the market, 
the value factor, the size factor, and the momentum factor (all from Ken French's web page); 
none have any effect on the abnormal returns.   
Comparing the earnings announcement premium to these other factors, the earnings 
announcement strategy has an annual Sharpe ratio of 0.94, while for value, size, momentum, and  
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the market, the highest Sharpe ratio over the same period is 0.70 for momentum (not shown in 
the table).  Thus the earnings announcement premium is statistically stronger and (before 
considering trading costs) economically more attractive than any other individual factor.   
Panel A of Table IV also shows other ways of classifying announcement months.  Using 
our simple algorithm based on fiscal year end over the period 1973– 2004, expected announcers 
earn a premium of 72 basis points.  The third row of Panel A shows the premium using actual (as 
opposed to expected) announcers.  This row is not an implementable strategy, and we show it 
simply for comparison.  It turns out that the results are very similar using actual announcement 
dates.   
Panel B looks across subperiods in the 1973-2004 period.  The premium is large and 
highly statistically significant across the entire sample period, delivering between 40 and 92 
basis points a month.  Despite the fact each sub-sample contains only 10 year worth of monthly 
data, we are able to safely reject the null hypothesis of a zero premium in each of the sub-periods 
between 1973 and 2004.   
In summary, using various different methods to predict announcement months produces 
large and statistically strong earnings announcement premia.  The premium is associated with a 
sizeable Sharpe ratio and is stable over different periods. 
B.  Premium using only fiscal year end 
In panel C of Table IV, we perform a test over the period 1926 – 1973.  As noted above, 
it is possible to construct a reasonable proxy of expected announcement months by only looking 
at fiscal year ends.  This allows us to extend the sample to the period before earnings 
announcement dates are available on Compustat.  Fiscal year end dates are available on 
Compustat starting in 1950.  To compute fiscal year end date for the period 1927–1949 we use  
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the firm’s first non missing fiscal year as a proxy.  For example, if firm XYZ started trading in 
1927 and reported a December fiscal year end in 1950, we assume it had a December fiscal year 
end between 1927 and 1949.  Although firms very rarely change their fiscal year, this 
assumption obviously introduces an additional source of forecast error.   
Is it reasonable to assume that firms the seasonal patterns observed subsequent to 1973 is 
a reliable proxy for the pattern of announcement month over the period 1927-1972? Obviously 
there are many factors influencing the distribution of announcing months that are likely to vary 
over time.  Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) report that in 1931, 63% percent of NYSE 
firms were publishing quarterly earnings.  By 1939, the NYSE required firms to report quarterly 
earnings, with some exceptions allowed.  The SEC imposed semiannual reporting requirements 
in 1955 and quarterly requirements in 1970.  Thus it appears that the patterns of reporting 
frequency observed post-1970 are likely to be noisy indicators of pre-1970 behavior, because of 
regulatory changes.  As a result, we view our expected announcement dates pre-1970 as 
informative but imperfect.  The various sources of forecast error will reduce the accuracy of our 
predictions and presumably make it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis. 
Panel B of Table IV shows monthly returns on the earnings announcement strategy.  
Despite the fact that we are using a noisy proxy for expected announcement months, there is 
clear evidence of a large premium.  Over the period 1926-1972, expected announcers have 
returns that are 38 basis points per month higher than expected non-announcers.  Figure 1 plots 
the annual returns of the long-short portfolio over the complete sample period from 1927 to 
2004.  Although, like everything else, the announcement strategy was quite volatile in the 1930's, 
it has consistently earned positive returns over the whole period.    
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C.  The premium and firm size 
In Table V we report the announcement premium by firm size.  Every month we sort 
stocks using the market value of equity at the end of the previous month and assign them to ten 
deciles portfolios using NYSE breakpoints, restricting the sample to firms with exactly four 
announcements in the previous year (thus discarding many small firms).  We report returns on 
the announcement strategy for these size deciles.  The results show that the earnings premium is 
not concentrated in small stocks.  Using the fiscal year method, it appears uniformly spread 
across size classes.  Using the previous year method, it is stronger in larger stocks.  In either 
case, it is clear that large cap stocks earn a large and significant premium.   
This fact that the premium does not appear larger for small firms is surprising for several 
reasons.  It is contrary to the explanation that higher trading costs allow a higher premium, and 
also contrary to the idea that earnings announcement generate larger volatility for small firms 
than for large firms due to lesser information about small firms.  This result contrasts with 
previous findings that the earnings premium is larger for small firms, although some of these 
results come from studies using actual (instead of expected) dates and narrow daily windows 
instead of wide monthly windows (Chari et al.  (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1991)). 
It is unclear precisely what the attention-grabbing hypothesis would predict about small 
vs.  large firms.  On the one hand, if there is less news in general about small stocks, than those 
rare days when news does occur should attract more attention.  On the other hand, many of these 
small stocks have earnings announcements that never get mentioned in the Wall Street Journal at 
all (thus leading to Compustat's low coverage of these announcements).  It is hard to grab the 
attention of an individual investor if your announcement is not reported. 
Due the erratic coverage of small firm announcement dates in Compustat, it is difficult to  
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draw any strong inferences about the difference between large and small firms, so we don't want 
to overemphasize our results on size.  It could be our results reflect poor data quality for small 
firms.  What we can say for sure is that for large firms, where data quality is high, and where our 
algorithms to forecast earnings announcement dates perform well, there is a sizeable earnings 
announcement premium. 
D.  The persistence of the premium 
So far we have shown that all firms tend to go up around announcement dates.  We now 
turn to the question of whether one can identify firms with a higher ex ante premium.  We start 
by sorting firms based on their past premium, and asking whether past premia predict future 
premia.  For every stock, we compute the average monthly return in announcement months 
minus the average monthly returns in non-announcements month over the previous four years.  
To be included in the portfolio, we require stocks to have a complete history of 16 
announcements over the past 48 months.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are 
ranked in order of their average announcement premium over the previous four years.  We assign 
stocks to one of five value weighted portfolios every month.  Within each portfolio, we report the 
returns of the (value weighted) strategy that is long stocks expected to announce and short stocks 
not expected to announce 
The results in Table VI show that stocks with high past premia tend to have high 
subsequent premia.  The first row shows that this month's premium is 0.44 percent per month for 
low past premium stocks, but a whopping 1.37 percent for high past premium stocks.  The 
forecastable difference in premium between these two groups is about 93 basis points per month.  
The rest of the rows in Panel A show that this predictability is very persistent.  While the first 
row shows returns in month t based on the past premium as of month t-1, the rows below use  
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information as of month t-j for various values of j.  Even if we discard all information from the 
past three years when sorting firms into quintiles (so that we are using past premia calculated 
from four to six years ago) we still get a sizable difference between the top and bottom quintile.  
Thus, whatever is causing differences in the premium is a slowly changing phenomenon. 
One possible complicating issue is the stock-specific seasonal of Heston and Sadka 
(2005).  They show that stocks that go up this month tend to go up twelve months later.  So, for 
example, some stocks tend to have high returns in June and some tend to have low returns in 
June.  Like us, they find a highly persistent seasonal lasting many years.  To ensure that this 
particular effect is not driving our results, in Panel B of Table VI we calculate the premium for 
month t by discarding all information from prior years from that same calendar month.  Thus our 
calculation of the premium uses 44 prior months of data (instead of 48 as in Panel A).  Panel B 
shows this adjustment produces little change in the results. 
To summarize, the earnings announcement premium varies across stocks.  Some stocks 
have a very high premium in expected announcement months, and it is easy to identify these 
stocks based on their past announcement premium.  This cross-sectional difference in premium is 
very persistent and it lasts many years. 
III.  The volume hypothesis 
We now turn to test the hypothesis that the predictable rise in stock price is driven by the 
predictable rise in trading activity around earnings announcements.  According to the volume 
hypothesis, some variable - disagreement, sentiment, or net buying pressure from attention-
constrained individuals - causes both volume and prices to rise around earnings announcements.  
In this section we start by looking at the average pattern of volume and returns.  We then turn to 
differences across different stocks in these patterns.  Last, we consider alternative explanations.  
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A.  Returns and volume around announcements 
Figure 2 gives a graphical depiction of the monthly patterns of returns and volume.  We 
show the average return and average abnormal volume in month t+k of a portfolio that is long 
month t announcers and short month t non-announcers. Our measure of trading activity is scaled 
volume (SV), defined as the ratio of share volume for firm j today to firm j's average monthly 



















      (1.1) 
Abnormal volume (AV) is defined as scaled volume minus the equal weight average of 









=− ∑        (1.2) 
Thus, under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, both abnormal volume and 
abnormal returns should be on average zero.  Looking at prices and trading activity subsequent to 
an earning announcement, it is clear that both return and volume exhibit a strong seasonal 
component. In the initial announcement month (month 0), announcing stocks earn a premium of 
60 basis points and abnormal volume of announcing firms, expressed a percent of average 
monthly volume, is 6.5% higher than abnormal volume of non announcers. Subsequent to initial 
announcement, prices rise on higher than average volume on announcing months and revert back 
on lower than average volume in non-announcing months, generating seasonal variation in 
expected returns. 
We now turn from monthly calendar time to daily event time.  Figure 3 and Table VII show 
event time volume and stock returns in the 20 trading day window around announcement dates.   
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To analyze high frequency trading activity around announcement dates, we use the actual 
announcement day recorded by Compustat.  Since Compustat announcement dates are based on 
press reports, the trading day in which the news is released to investors could be anywhere from 
day -1 to day +1.
2  Since announcement coverage is erratic for smaller firms, we restrict the 
sample to stocks with market capitalization above CRSP median.  We calculate abnormal returns 








=− ∑    (1.3) 
To get abnormal volume, we calculate daily (instead of monthly) versions of equations 
(1.1) and (1.2).  For these calculations, non-announcers are defined as firms not announcing 
within a 20 day window around the announcement.  We cumulate returns and volume by trading 
days.  Note that since Figure 3 is drawn in event time and uses the actual announcement date, it 
does not reflect a tradable strategy.   
The cumulative abnormal return in Figure 3 and Table VII show the timing of the 
earnings announcement premium.  Most of the premium is not earned in the three-day window 
surrounding the announcement.  Instead, there is a pre-announcement run-up of about 25 basis 
points in the 10 trading days prior to the announcement, then another 21 basis points earned in 
the three days around the announcement, and finally an additional 30 basis points earned in the 
days subsequent the announcement (as shown in Table VII, these three mean estimates all 
separately have t-statistics above 7).  This pattern helps motivate our use of monthly, rather than 
daily, returns in the previous analysis. 
Cumulative abnormal volume displays slightly a different pattern from cumulative 
abnormal returns.  Rather than rising prior to the announcement, volume is below average before  
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announcements (as noted in Chae (2005)).  Volume dramatically surges right at the 
announcement, and remains above average for the next 10 trading days.  As one can see from the 
figure and from table VIII, volume on day 0 is more than 50% higher than average.  Thus 
increases in volume around announcements are quite substantial.  Since volume and returns 
move together during and after the announcement, the volume hypothesis can explain both the 
event-day returns and the post-event drift in returns.  It has a harder time explaining the pre-
event  price run-up, a subject we return to later.   
B.  Cross-sectional differences in volume and return 
Looking at Figure 3 it is clear that on average, volume and returns are both quite elevated 
on announcement dates.  A different question is whether those firms with predictably high 
announcement period volume also tend to have high announcement period returns.  Table VIII 
directly tests this cross-sectional volume hypothesis.  In order to test for return predictability 
around scheduled announcements induced by volume predictability, we sort stocks in different 
classes for which scheduled announcement are more likely to induce the largest increase in 
trading activity, and construct a long-short portfolio as before.  The volume hypothesis predicts 
that a cross-sectional variable that forecasts differences in trading volume in announcement 
months should forecast differences in subsequent announcement premia.   
Our sorting variable is, for each stock, the volume concentration ratio defined as the percent 
of total share volume over the previous four years that occurred in (actual) announcement 
months.  Thus we are not sorting on generic high turnover; rather we are sorting on whether 
trading activity tends to be concentrated in a specific four month period out of the year.  For 
example: suppose that the total share volume of stock XYZ in the past 4 years was 10,000 shares 
and the total number of shares traded over the past 16 announcement months was 7,500 shares,  
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then the volume concentration ratio is given by 7,500 / 10,000 = 75%.  To avoid the price 
dynamics associated with high frequency changes in volume (as in Gervais et al.  (2001)), we lag 
the volume concentration ratio by 3 months when forming portfolios based on this measure.   
 We sort stocks based on past increases in volume in earnings announcement months, and test 
whether portfolios with predictably higher volume around earning announcements have 
predictably higher returns.  According to the volume hypothesis, firms whose volume is 
concentrated in specific dates should also have returns concentrated in those dates.  Panel A of 
Table VIII shows first that past volume concentration in announcement months does a good job 
forecasting subsequent abnormal volume in expected announcement months.  We use equation 
(1.1) to calculate abnormal volume, measured in units of this month's volume as a fraction of 
prior average monthly volume. 
Looking at the difference between high volume concentration and low volume concentration 
stocks, it is striking that high volume concentration today predicts higher subsequent abnormal 
volume on announcing months and lower subsequent volume in non-announcing months.  For 
stocks whose past volume is mostly concentrated in announcement months (high volume 
concentration ratio stocks), volume is about 9% higher than average in expected announcement 
months.  For stocks whose past volume is not concentrated in earnings announcement months 
(low volume concentration ratio stocks), there is no statistically significant increase in volume in 
expected announcement months.  Thus some firms have trading activity concentrated around 
earnings releases; these stocks have persistently high announcement-related volume, and other 
stocks do not.   
Panels C and D show that the predictable increase in volume does indeed lead to 
predictable return.  For the high volume concentration stocks, the monthly strategy of going long  
Earnings announcement premium – Page 20 
expected announcers and short a portfolio of expected non-announcers earns 153 basis points per 
month with a t-statistic of 6.  For the low volume concentration stocks, the announcement 
premium is 39 basis points per month and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Thus, 
consistent with the volume hypothesis, high volume concentration ratio stocks experience 
predictably high volume and high returns in expected announcement months, generating an 
announcement premium around 18% per year.   
In expected non-announcement months, low volume concentration stocks earn excess 
returns of 74 basis points while high volume concentration stocks earn only 39 basis points.  This 
statistically significant difference of 35 basis points suggests that the high returns on 
announcement months tend to reverse in subsequent months.  High premium stocks tend to "give 
back" their premium in non-announcement months.  Thus the high returns generated by high 
announcement volume seem to have no permanent effect.  Instead, at least in this specific 
context, high volume creates temporary components in stock prices. 
Figure 4 shows the timing of the earnings announcement premium for the two different 
groups of stocks.  As for Figure 3, we use actual announcements and restrict the sample to firms 
above the CRSP median to produce daily plots in event time.  The daily pattern in Figure 4 
confirms that the monthly pattern in Table VIII is not concentrated on a small window around 
announcement dates.  Figure 4 shows that stocks with high past volume concentration have a 
surge in volume right around the announcement date, while the low volume concentration group 
has a much smaller increase in volume.  Stocks with high prior volume concentration also have a 
much higher cumulative abnormal returns, starting (as in Figure 3) several days before the 
announcement (around 60 basis points) and continuing after (earning an additional 60 basis 
points).  The surge in volume in high concentration stocks persists for the two week period  
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subsequent to the announcement, inducing the large post announcement drift.  Conversely, 
subsequent to the announcement low concentration stocks show a smaller increase in volume and 
post event premium.   
To summarize, the evidence is consistent with high volume causing high returns, or at 
least some third variable causing both volume and returns.  Stocks without predictably high 
announcement volume have a small earnings announcement premium that is insignificantly 
different from zero.  Stocks with predictably high announcement volume have a premium of 
1.5% per month, allowing us to construct a long/short portfolio generating 18% per year.   
C.  Idiosyncratic volatility 
As discussed already, standard measures of systematic risk do not explain the premium.  
Another hypothesis is that the earnings announcement premium reflects compensation for 
idiosyncratic risk.  In Table VIII, we display one measure of idiosyncratic risk in the different 
months.  For each portfolio and month, we calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation of raw 
returns for the stocks in that portfolio in that month.  We then average across all months, 1973-
2004, and report the time-series average of this cross-sectional number as our measure of 
idiosyncratic risk.   
Idiosyncratic risk is indeed higher in announcement months.  Across all stocks with 
exactly four earnings announcements in the prior calendar year, the monthly standard deviation 
of returns rises from about 13.7% in expected non-announcement months to about 14.7% in 
expected announcement months (not reported in the table).  Panel B in Table VIII shows that 
high volume concentration stocks have higher idiosyncratic volatility increases in announcement 
months than low volume concentration stocks.  Thus there is some evidence that higher premium 
stocks have higher earnings-related idiosyncratic risk.  
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However, it seems unlikely that a story where all types of idiosyncratic risk earn a 
premium can explain the magnitudes observed in Tables VIII.  The high volume group has 
excess returns that are 1.9% on expected announcement months and 0.4% per month on other 
months.  Volatility is 14.5% in expected announcement months and 12.6% in other months.  It 
seems unlikely that such large differences in return could be explained by such small differences 
in volatility. 
One possible theory is that announcement period returns reflect fundamental/permanent 
innovations in prices, while non-announcement returns reflect sentiment/noise/temporary 
innovations in prices.  In the framework of Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004), perhaps earnings announcement returns reflect cash flow news while non-
announcement returns reflect future return news.  If fundamental idiosyncratic risk earns a 
premium while non-fundamental idiosyncratic risk does not, then that would explain high 
average returns around expected announcement dates (of course, one would need to develop 
models where idiosyncratic risk is priced).  While this explanation is appealing and may well 
contain some truth, it fails to generate predictions about volume, and as we have shown, volume 
is a key element of the story.   
A different story about idiosyncratic risk is that it is a limit to arbitrage that prevents 
sophisticated investors from eliminating the earnings premium.  If for some reason arbitrageurs 
are unable to sufficiently diversify, then the high risk around announcements would deter 
attempts to eliminate the anomaly.  While this explanation is undoubtedly true, it fails to explain 
the sign of the premium: it explain why rational arbitragers may fail to smooth prices but it does 
not explain why the premium arises in the first place.    
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D.  Other explanations for the premium 
We here consider other non-volume explanations for the earnings announcement 
premium.  One explanation for the premium is based on analyst forecast bias.  There is evidence 
that firms and analysts cooperate to produce analyst earnings forecasts for the upcoming quarters 
that are biased downward (Richardson et al.  (2004)).  Analyst set earnings forecasts such that 
the firm rarely falls short and frequently exceeds consensus earnings estimates.  If naive 
investors fail to realize this downward bias in forecasts, then these naive investors will tend to be 
consistently positively surprised by the actual earnings announcement.  If these investors affect 
market prices, they will consistently push up prices on earnings announcements because they 
perceive most announcements to be good news.   
A related explanation reflects naive anchoring.  Perhaps investors compare this quarters 
earnings to historical earnings.  In an economy with nominal profits growing due to either 
inflation or real growth, on average, investors using these naive benchmarks will constantly be 
surprised by this quarter's high earnings and will send prices higher.   
These explanations based on naive investor surprise, while appealing, fail to predict the 
cross-sectional relation between volume and the premium.  Two other pieces of evidence cast 
doubt on this class of explanations.  First, as detailed in Barber and Odean (2004) and Hirshleifer 
et al. (2004) individual investors are net buyers in response to either positive surprises (such as 
extremely high earnings growth) or negative surprises (such as extremely low earnings growth).  
Buying by the least sophisticated investors in response to bad news seems inconsistent with the 
naive anchoring story.  Second, as shown in Table IV, the earnings announcement premium 
appears in many different subperiods.  Analyst forecasts and consensus earnings estimates are a 
relatively recent development and are unlikely to explain return patterns prior to the 1970s.   
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Inflation varied widely over this period, yet the premium shows up in low inflation periods (such 
as 1927-1949) as well as high inflation periods (such as 1973-1983).  So the stability of the 
premium suggests a more general explanation. 
Another possible explanation is liquidity.  If announcement dates involve high levels of 
asymmetric information or low liquidity, then investors will demand a premium to hold stocks 
during this period.  While this explanation seems feasible for the day or two right before the 
announcement, it is not a plausible explanation for a strategy that buys two weeks before the 
announcement and sells two weeks after.  Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), for example, show 
bid/ask spreads widening in the hours surrounding the announcement but quickly reverting to 
normal within a day or two.   
IV.  Order imbalances around announcement days 
In this section we examine daily order flow and returns around actual announcement days 
in event time.  According to the attention-grabbing hypothesis, individual investor buying is 
triggered by the announcement.  We investigate this hypothesis by calculating imputed order 
flow from large and small investors.  We view the evidence in this section as primarily 
suggestive since it relies on a number of assumptions. 
To compute trading imbalances around earnings announcements we use the NYSE 
Trades and Quotations (TAQ) database.  We split trades based on the dollar value of the trade 
and compute a measure of trade-initiation which captures which side of the trade demands 
immediate execution.  We identify each trade on the TAQ tape as buyer or seller initiated using 
the procedure detailed in Lee and Ready (1991) and Odders and White (2000).  A trade is 
classified as buyer initiated if the trade price is above the quote midpoint of the most recent bid 
ask spread, or if the trade price is above the last executed trade price.  
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Our goal is to identify trading activity by individual investors.  To identify retail 
investors, we use the standard assumption that individuals use small trade sizes and institutional 
investors use larger trade sizes.  We use trades less than $5,000 (small trades) as a proxy for 
individual investors’ trades and trades over $50,000 (big trades) as a proxy for institutional 
trades.
3  As confirmed by Barber et al.  (2005) and Hvidkjaer (2005), this assumption produces 
fairly accurate classifications of trader types prior to the year 2000.  Subsequent to 2000, changes 
in market environment (such as decimalization and algorithmic trading) cause this classification 
to be less reliable.  Thus we restrict our analysis to the period 1993-2000. 
One of the earliest applications of this approach is the Lee (1992) study of individual 
investor trading in the hours and minutes around earnings announcements (see also Bhattacharya 
(2001), Hirshleifer et al.  (2004) and Battalio and Mendenhall (2005)).  Instead, we perform a 
daily analysis and use the intraday data only in order to calculate daily-level aggregates.  For 
every stock and for the two size categories (small and big) we compute order imbalances (Net 
Buy) as the ratio of buyer initiated volume minus seller initiated volume for firm j today to firm j 





























Where BUY is total buyer initiated volume in day t, SELL is total seller initiated volume, and 
VOL is daily volume (all measured as number of shares).  We calculate Abnormal Net Buy as the  
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normalized trade imbalances by subtracting from Net Buy the equal weighted average of it for all 
non-announcing firms that day. 
 
1
tt t no ann
non ann
Abnormal Net Buy Net Buy Net Buy
n
=− ∑  (1.5) 
Non-announcers are defined as firms not announcing within a 20 day window around the 
announcement.  Thus, under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, Abnormal Net Buy 
should be on average zero. 
Figure 5 shows Abnormal Net Buy in event time.  Consistent with the attention-grabbing 
hypothesis (and with Lee (1992), Barber et al.  (2005) and Hirshleifer et al.  (2004)),  small 
investor buying soars on the announcement day.  Compared to net buying by institutions, which 
seem to fluctuate somewhat, the peak in small buying is quite pronounced.  When interpreting 
Figure 5, it is important to keep in mind that our method of imputing orders and the identity of 
the traders (though standard) produces noisy measures of true individual behavior.  Other studies 
confirm that our method is sufficiently accurate to uncover the important properties of the data, 
so the shape of the small buy curve is probably a good guide to reality.
4  On the other hand, the 
precise quantities shown on the axis of Figure 5 might not be reliable.  For example, Figure 5 
shows that the magnitude of institutional trading is far larger than the magnitude of individual 
trading, which is not surprising given the mechanical definitions based on trade side.  Thus we 
view Figure 5 as suggestive but not conclusive evidence. 
Looking at the pattern of net buying by institutions shows an intriguing pattern over time.  
According to our measure, large investors buy in the days preceding earnings announcements.  In 
particular, large imputed buy orders appear to peak the day before small imputed buy orders.  
Large investors’ buying activity drops on the announcement day and on the two trading days 
subsequent to the announcement, when individual buying is most intense. Thus large investors  
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appear to be front-running small investors buy initiating purchases of announcement stocks in 
the weeks prior to an earnings announcement.   
One interpretation of this evidence is that the “smart money” appropriately anticipates net 
buying by the “dumb money”: large investors tend to purchase announcing stocks prior to the 
announcement. This process is precisely what should be happening in an efficient market: 
sophisticated traders should be accommodating uninformed demand shocks and smoothing 
prices, thus eliminating predictable returns.  However, while large traders appear to be 
arbitraging away the anomaly, apparently they are not arbitraging enough, for the small traders 
are still affecting prices. 
This pattern of trading by large investors is our explanation for the pre-announcement 
run-up in prices.  Large traders, anticipating uninformed buying, buy stocks in the days and 
weeks ahead of the scheduled announcement.  In the absence of these large traders, the spike in 
cumulative abnormal returns at day 0 shown in figure 3 would be much more pronounced.  So 
the large traders help smooth out the spike in prices, although something prevents them from 
smoothing it all the way down to a flat line.  Of course, if these large traders cause a rise in 
prices from date t-10 to t-1, one might ask why some third class of traders do not front-run them 
and buy at date t-11.  A possible answer is idiosyncratic risk or holding costs.  If sophisticated 
traders are unable to fully diversify or face a high daily cost of holding shares, then they will 
trade off price appreciation against length of holding period.  
Figure 6 connects imputed buying with the volume-related measure shown in Table VIII.  
We separately examine stocks with high and low concentration of trading activity around 
previous announcements.  For the two groups of stocks, we cumulate the small net order flow of 
the type shown in Figure 5.  Table VIII shows that the lagged volume concentration ratio  
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forecasts both high returns and high volume around announcement dates.  Figure 6 shows that 
this variable may capturing buying from small investors: high past announcement-related volume 
predicts buying by small investors.  Firms with high past announcement volume have high small 
buys surging on the announcement, while firms with low past announcement volume have no 
discernable announcement effect.   
Thus three common features characterize the behavior of security prices around 
scheduled earning announcements for this set of firms: high returns around announcements, high 
trading volume around announcements, and high small investor buying pressure around 
announcements.  Our interpretation of this evidence is that there are some firms who have more 
attention-grabbing earnings announcements or who have an investor base that is more attention-
constrained.  It may be that these firms have more media coverage devoted to their earnings, or 
have more variable earnings, or appeal differently to inattentive investors.  For whatever reason, 
year after year, these firms garner small investor attention around earnings announcements dates.  
Consistent with the attention-grabbing hypothesis, these firms earn predictable higher returns 
around earnings announcements. 
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper we test whether predicable increases in volume lead to predictable increases in 
prices.  Quarterly earnings announcements, frequent events that are scheduled at known 
intervals, exogenously occurring, and that generate substantial volume, provide a natural setting 
to test the hypothesis that predictable volume generates predictable returns.  We focus on 
monthly data using expected announcement months based on stale information, hence issues 
related to timing of the announcement or changes in liquidity around the announcement dates are 
unlikely to be an issue.    
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We show that the strategy of buying every stock expected to announce over the 
subsequent month and shorting every stock not expected to announce yields a return of over 60 
basis points per month.  We show that announcement premium is quantitatively substantial, 
especially among large cap securities, lasts about 20 days, and is evident in samples going back 
to 1927. 
Consistent with the volume hypothesis, stocks with the largest predicted volume 
increases in announcement months (as forecasted by a high concentration of past trading activity 
around earnings announcements) tend to have higher subsequent premia.  These stocks also tend 
to have the highest imputed buying by small investors around announcement dates.  
Mounting evidence shows individuals investors appear to make uninformed trading 
decisions.
5 Consistent with the attention-grabbing hypothesis, according to which individual 
investors are more likely to initiated purchases on stocks that grab their attention via an earnings 
announcement, small investors buys (as proxied by small buyer initiated trades) soar on 
announcement day, especially for securities where most of the past trading activity in 
concentrated around announcements.  One coherent explanation of these facts is that some 
securities attract small attention constrained investors around earnings announcement dates.  
Since these investors rarely sell short, the predictable rise in volume pushes prices higher around 
announcement dates, generating a seasonal component in the stock’s expected return.  
These results fit into the broader research effort to connect trading activity to prices.  
Concepts such as liquidity, information flow, heterogeneous beliefs, and short sale constraints 
are all potentially important in understanding this connection.  The evidence here imposes an 
additional requirement on any theory attempting to connect volume and prices.  Any theory now 
must explain why highly predictable volume leads to highly predictable return.  One potential  
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explanation is uninformed demand by individuals, coupled with imperfect arbitrage by informed 
traders. 
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 If the forecasting algorithm was completely accurate, 100% of the announcements would fall in 
predicted months.  If the algorithm was completely random, only 33% of the announcements 
would (for firms with four announcements per year). 
2 For announcements reported on days where the market is closed, we use the next available 
business day as the announcement date.   
3 Several papers rely on similar dollar cutoff to separate trading imbalances of individual and 
institutional investors.  See for example, Lee (1992), Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and more 
recently Hvidkjaer (2005) and Barber et al.  (2005). 
4 Barber and at.  (2005), who have access to actual individual trade data and use the same dollar 
cutoffs, show that order imbalances of buyer and seller initiated small trades on TAQ are highly 
correlated which purchases and sales by individual investors at a large discount brokerage house 
(1991–1996) and at a large retail brokerage house (1997-1999)/ 
5 See Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (1999) and Frazzini and Lamont (2006).  
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Table I: Coverage of earnings announcement dates, 1973 – 2004 
 
Panel A shows coverage of earnings announcement dates for CRSP/COMPUSTAT stocks.  The earnings 
announcement represents the date in which quarterly earnings and earnings per share figures are first 
publicly reported in the various news media.  “At least one (four) ann.” is the fraction of Compustat firms 
with at least one announcement that calendar year.  “Exactly four ann” is the fraction of Compustat firms 
with exactly four announcements that calendar year.  “Larger firms” are all firms with market capitalization 
above the median of the CRSP/COMPUSTAT universe that year, “smaller firms” are below median.   
“Market value” is the total market capitalization of firms with exactly four announcements in that calendar 
year divided by the total market value of the CRSP/COMPUSTAT stock universe. 
 
Panel A: coverage of earnings announcement dates 
      Exactly 4 ann 
year  At least one ann    All firms  smaller firms  larger firms  market value 
1973  0.79    0.70 0.66 0.73 0.84 
1974  0.55    0.50 0.33 0.66 0.88 
2004  0.98    0.95 0.94 0.97 0.98 
1973-2004  0.77    0.68 0.54 0.82 0.96 
 
Panel B shows distribution of earnings announcement dates for CRSP/COMPUSTAT stocks.  Column one 
reports the fraction of firms with fiscal year ending in each calendar month.  Column two reports the 
fraction of earnings announcements occurring in each calendar month.  Column three reports the fraction of 
fourth fiscal quarter earnings announcements occurring in each calendar month.  Column four reports the 
fraction of first, second or third fiscal quarter earnings announcements occurring in each calendar month.  
Column five and six report the distribution of earnings announcements for firm with fiscal year ending in 
December.   
 
Panel B: distribution of earnings announcement dates 
    all firms  Dec fiscal year 
  Fiscal yr end  Ann  Q4  Q1-Q3  Q4  Q1-Q3 
Jan  4.32  9.73 23.96 5.15 36.49 0.00 
Feb  1.76  9.79 29.22 3.52 45.89 0.00 
Mar  4.82  4.71 12.38 2.24 15.32 0.01 
Apr  1.94 15.21 4.08 18.80 2.27 23.97 
May  2.04 7.59 3.44 8.93 0.01 8.53 
Jun  8.29 2.41 2.77 2.29 0.00 0.09 
Jul  2.07 15.01 3.44 18.74 0.00 25.12 
Aug  1.96 7.51 5.31 8.22 0.00 8.01 
Sep  7.02 2.46 3.18 2.22 0.00 0.14 
Oct  2.75 15.69 4.02 19.45 0.00 25.85 
Nov  1.51 7.38 4.71 8.24 0.00 8.26 
Dec  61.52  2.52 3.50 2.20 0.01 0.03  
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Table II: Accuracy of announcement date prediction, 1973-2004 
 
This table shows the accuracy of announcement date prediction.  We report the fraction of announcements that occur on expected date and the fraction of 
announcements that do not occur on expected dates.  This table includes all available stocks.  The top part of panel A reports results for announcements predicted 
based on fiscal year end.  At the beginning of each calendar month t, we compute the frequency of announcements in table A1 using data available up to month t.  
We assign each firms to one of two portfolios: if calendar month t+1 matches any of four calendar months with the highest number of announcements 
corresponding to the firms’ fiscal year end month, we classify the firms as expected announcer in month t+1, provided that the firm did not have an 
announcement in month t.  If calendar month t+1 does not match any of the four calendar months with the highest number of announcements corresponding to 
the firms’ fiscal year end month, or the firms has an announcement in month t, we classify the firm as expected non-announcer in month t+1.  The bottom part of 
panel A reports results for announcements predicted based on the previous year.  We set the expected announcement month equal to the firm’s previous year 
announcement month, provided that the firm did not have an announcement in the last calendar month.  Panel B report the accuracy of announcement date 
prediction by firms size.  We assign firms to size deciles at the beginning of each calendar month using NYSE breakpoints. 
 
 
 All  firms  Four  announcements in the previous year 
  1973 - 2004  1973-2004  1973-1983  1984-1993  1994-2004 
Ann predicted based on fiscal year end             
% Announcement  0.54 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.72 
% No announcement  0.46 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.28 
Ann predicted based on previous year             
% Announcement  0.80 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93 
% No announcement  0.20 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Size  Decile    1  (small)  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  (large) 
Ann predicted based on fiscal year end             
% Announcement  0.31 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.86  0.86 0.91 
% No announcement  0.69 0.42 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.14  0.14 0.09 
Ann predicted based on previous year             
% Announcement  0.75 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.90  0.92 0.94 
% No announcement  0.25 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10  0.08 0.06 
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Table III: Excess returns on expected announcement months vs other months, 1973-
2004 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio excess returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks 
are assigned to one of two portfolios (expected announcers and expected non-announcers) using 
announcements predicted based on the previous year.  All stocks are value weighted within a given 
portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights.  This table 
includes all available stocks with four announcements in the previous twelve months at portfolio formation. 
We report average portfolio returns minus Treasury bill returns in the period 1973 to 2004.  Returns are in 
monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.  L/S is monthly average return of a 









Mean  0.529  0.329  0.942 0.613 
t-statistic  [2.28] [1.34]  [3.60] [5.30] 
       
Std  deviation  4.598 4.802  5.117 2.264 
Skewness -0.438  -0.535  -0.032 1.366 
kurtosis 4.749  5.436 4.882  11.095 
Sharpe  ratio  0.115 0.069  0.184 0.271 
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Table IV: The earnings announcement premium 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio abnormal returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are 
assigned to one of two portfolios (expected announcers and expected non-announcers) using either 
announcement predicted based on fiscal year end, or announcement predicted based on the previous year.  All 
stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to 
maintain value weights.  This table includes all available stocks with four announcements in the previous twelve 
months at portfolio formation.  We report the monthly return of a zero cost portfolio that hold the portfolio of 
expected announcers and sell short the portfolio of expected non-announcers.  Alpha is the intercept on a 
regression of return from the rolling strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and 
French (1993) mimicking portfolios and Carhart (1997) momentum factor.  # of stocks is the average number of 
stocks in the portfolio.  Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient 
estimates. 
 
 xret  Alpha    MKT  SMB  HML  UMD  R2 
Panel A: Full sample 1973-2004, different methods, 4 prior announcements required 
previous year  0.613 0.613   -0.037  0.031  -0.135  0.087 0.07 
  [5.30] [5.13]    [-1.33] [0.87] [-3.24] [3.32]   
fiscal year end  0.723 0.77   0.005  -0.037 -0.082 -0.001  0.009 
 [5.09]  [5.08]    [0.14]  [-0.83]  [-1.55]  [-0.03]   
Actual dates  0.603 0.599   -0.012  -0.013  -0.094 0.063 0.038 
  [5.82]  [5.51]    [-0.47] [-0.40] [-2.47] [2.60]   
Panel B: Subsamples, 1973-2004, using previous year method, 4 prior ann required 
1973 – 1983  0.396 0.438    -0.023 -0.087 -0.029 0.034  0.035 
  [2.21]  [2.22]    [-0.51] [-1.34] [-0.42] [0.73]   
1984-  1993  0.521 0.592    -0.025 -0.064 -0.114 -0.029 0.034 
  [3.79]  [4.00]    [-0.70] [-1.03] [-1.81] [-0.62]   
1994 – 2004  0.915 0.811   0.029  0.081  -0.135  0.149  0.171 
 [3.58]  [3.21]    [0.44]  [1.22]  [-1.58]  [3.28]   
Panel C: Fiscal year-end method, testing back to 1927, no prior ann required 
1927 – 1972  0.384 0.390   -0.004  0.03  0.022  -0.025  0.007 
 [3.41]  [3.33]    [-0.19]  [0.84]  [0.59]  [-0.89]   
1927 – 1949   0.510 0.526   -0.010  0.005  0.023  -0.04  0.009 
 [2.53]  [2.55]    [-0.28]  [0.09]  [0.41]  [-0.99]   
1950- 1972   0.259  0.210  0.001  0.102  0.038 0.034 0.021 
  [2.56] [1.91]    [0.04] [2.23] [0.78] [0.87]   
1973-2004  0.727 0.774   0.002  -0.039 -0.081  0.001  0.009 
 [5.16]  [5.15]    [0.07]  [-0.87]  [-1.55]  [0.02]   
Full sample 1927 – 2004  0.523 0.528   0.013  0.011  -0.007 -0.018  0.003 
 [5.91]  [5.71]    [0.72]  [0.41]  [-0.24]  [-0.84]    
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Table V: Robustness checks: size, 1973–2004 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio abnormal returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are assigned to one of two portfolios (expected 
announcers and expected non-announcers) using either announcement predicted based on fiscal year end, or announcement predicted based on the previous year.  
All stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights.  This table includes all 
available stocks in the period 1973 to 2004 with four announcements in the previous twelve months at portfolio formation.  We report the monthly return of a 
zero cost portfolio that hold the portfolio of expected announcers and sell short the portfolio of expected non-announcers.  # of stocks is the average number of 
stocks in the portfolio.  We assign firms to size deciles at the beginning of each calendar month using NYSE breakpoints.  Returns and alphas are in monthly 
percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 
 
  
Size  decile  1(small)  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  (large) 
            
Ann based on previous year  0.021  0.300 0.300 0.413 0.351 0.548 0.749 0.724 0.693 0.621 
  [0.27] [2.97] [2.63] [3.26] [2.43] [4.25] [5.32] [5.10] [4.48] [3.48] 
            
Ann based on fiscal year end   0.705 0.615 0.589 0.408 0.663 0.605 0.459 0.952 0.688 0.719 
  [8.16] [5.64] [4.70] [2.96] [4.09] [3.75] [2.91] [5.51] [3.52] [3.61] 
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Table VI: The persistence of the announcement premium, 1973-2004 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are ranked in 
ascending order on the basis of the previous announcement premium (PREMIUM).  The ranked stocks are assigned to 
one of 5 quintile portfolios.  We use four year premium, defined as average return on the previous 16 announcement 
months minus by the average return on non-announcement months in the previous 48 months.  We lag PREMIUM 
from one month to five years.  Within each quintile, we assign stocks to one of two portfolios (expected announcers 
and expected non-announcers) using announcement predicted based on the previous year.  All stocks are value 
weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights.  
This table includes all available stocks in the period 1973 to 2004 with 16 announcements in the previous 48 months at 
portfolio formation.  L/S is the return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of expected announcers and sell 
short the portfolio of expected non-announcers. Average # of stocks per month is the average number of announcers 
and non announcers per calendar month. Returns are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient 
estimates.   
 
 
Panel A:  sort on lagged announcement premium 





1(low)  2 3 4  5(high)  5-1 
Expected non-announcers  1323  335  1.103 0.598 0.278 0.479 1.010 -0.094 
Expected announcers    590    1.549 0.950 0.948 1.278 2.379 0.834 
L/S  1913   0.441 0.412 0.649 0.788 1.369 0.928 
     [1.60] [1.93] [3.38] [4.64] [6.06] [2.68] 
           
Skip 1 year, L/S  1680 324  0.192  0.607 0.590 0.972 1.230 1.038 
     [0.70] [2.39] [2.90] [4.52] [5.99] [2.89] 
           
Skip 3 years, L/S  1400 300  0.146  0.763 0.479 0.754 0.961 0.816 
      [0.55] [3.22] [2.19] [2.92] [4.44] [2.44] 
           
Skip 5 years, L/S  1192 240  0.799  0.196  0.659 0.780 0.780 -0.020 
     [2.93] [0.91] [2.69] [3.54] [3.58] [-0.06] 
           
Panel B: lagged announcement premium, skip announcement in t-12, t-24, t-36, t-48 
           
Expected non-announcers  1323  335  0.911 0.375 0.339 0.371 0.803 -0.108 
Expected announcers  590    1.115 0.965 0.798 1.080 2.287 1.172 
L/S  1913   0.204  0.565 0.475 0.691 1.484 1.280 
      [0.86] [2.55] [3.02] [4.88] [6.87] [4.04] 
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Table VII: Event time returns and volume around announcements, 1973–2004 
 
This table shows event time average abnormal returns and average abnormal volume around earnings announcements 
dates.  Abnormal return (AR) is defined as daily return minus the return of an equally weighted portfolio of all non-
announcing firms that day.  Abnormal volume AV is defined as daily scaled volume minus the average scaled volume of 
a portfolio of all non-announcing firms that day 
(1/ )
j jn o a n n j
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where SV (scaled volume) is the ratio of daily share volume for firm j to firm j's average daily volume over the previous 
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We exclude a window of  10 ±  trading days around the announcement to compute non-event averages.  We cumulate by 
trading days to obtain cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs).  This table includes all available stocks in the 
period 1973 to 2004 with exactly four earnings announcement during the previous calendar year and market 
capitalization above the median of the CRSP/COMPUSTAT universe that day. T-statistics are calculated using the 




Trading  day  AR t-stat  CAARs t-stat  AV t-stat  CAAVs t-stat 
-10 0.020%  (2.21)  0.020% (2.21)  -2.26% (-1.69) -2.26% (-1.69) 
-9 0.013%  (1.60)  0.034% (2.71)  -2.33% (-1.81) -4.59% (-2.47) 
-8 0.015%  (2.44)  0.049% (3.52)  -2.84% (-2.11) -7.43% (-3.24) 
-7 0.014%  (1.51)  0.063% (3.76)  -3.95% (-2.98)  -11.37% (-4.29) 
-6 0.026%  (2.49)  0.089% (4.51)  -4.36% (-3.46)  -15.74% (-5.36) 
-5 0.023%  (2.06)  0.113% (4.94)  -4.17% (-4.04)  -19.91% (-6.40) 
-4 0.027%  (2.96)  0.139% (5.68)  -4.49% (-3.62)  -24.40% (-7.29) 
-3 0.050%  (4.55)  0.189% (7.04)  -3.79% (-3.51)  -28.19% (-8.01) 
-2 0.060%  (4.21)  0.249% (8.19)  -1.66% (-1.35)  -29.86% (-8.01) 
-1 0.089%  (4.23)  0.338% (9.15)  17.70% (7.04)  -12.15% (-2.70) 
0 0.089%  (5.11)  0.428% (10.45) 52.47% (20.76) 40.31% (7.82) 
1 0.032%  (2.89)  0.460% (10.84) 52.52% (9.89)  92.83% (12.54) 
2 0.041%  (3.86)  0.501% (11.46) 20.12% (11.89)  112.95% (14.87) 
3 0.010%  (1.34)  0.511% (11.52) 11.52% (9.57)  124.47% (16.19) 
4 0.040%  (5.30)  0.551% (12.24)  6.92% (7.86)  131.39% (16.98) 
5 0.045%  (4.25)  0.596% (12.89)  4.41% (4.73)  135.80% (17.42) 
6 0.045%  (5.43)  0.641% (13.64)  3.35% (3.00)  139.16% (17.67) 
7 0.029%  (3.57)  0.670% (14.05)  1.96% (2.00)  141.11% (17.78) 
8 0.035%  (3.66)  0.705% (14.50)  1.45% (1.34)  142.57% (17.80) 
8 0.029%  (4.28)  0.733% (14.94)  0.86% (0.79)  143.43% (17.74) 
10 0.023%  (3.42)  0.756% (15.27)  0.66% (0.62)  144.09% (17.67) 
          
[-10,-2]  0.249% (8.19)     -29.86% -(8.01)    
[-1  ,  1]  0.210%  (7.13)    122.69%  (19.18)   
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Table VIII: The Volume Hypothesis, 1973 – 2004 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio abnormal returns, abnormal volume and volatility.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are ranked in 
ascending order on the basis of the volume concentration ratio defined as volume on the previous 16 announcements months divided by the total volume in the 
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where VOL is monthly volume and ANN is a dummy equal to 1 on announcement months and zero otherwise.  The ratio is lagged 3 months.  The ranked stocks 
are assigned to one of 5 quintile portfolios.  Within each quintile, we assign stocks to one of two portfolios (expected announcers and expected non-announcers) 
using announcement predicted based on the previous year.  All stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every 
calendar month to maintain value weights.  This table includes all available stocks in the period 1973 to 2004 with 16 announcements in the previous 48 months 
at portfolio formation.  We report average portfolio returns minus Treasury bill returns, alpha, abnormal volume and volatility.  L/S is a zero cost portfolio that 
holds the portfolio of expected announcers and sells short the portfolio of expected non-announcers.  Scaled volume (SV) is defined as the ratio of share volume 
for firm j today to firm j's average monthly volume over the previous 12 months.  We market-adjust this measure by subtracting from it the equal weight average 
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Volatility is defined as follows: for each portfolio and month, we calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation of raw returns for the stocks in that portfolio in 
that month.  We then average across all months, 1973-2004, and report the time-series average .Alpha is the intercept on a regression of return from the rolling 
strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios and Carhart (1997) momentum factor.  Returns, 
alphas, volatility and volume are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 
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  Panel A: Abnormal volume (%)    Panel B: idiosyncratic volatility (%) 
Low volume concentration   0.288 2.070 -0.104 2.174    13.212 13.634 12.887  0.746 
 [0.35]  [1.94]  [-0.15]  [1.82]    [54.09]  [48.61]  [51.47]  [3.24] 
High volume concentration   0.461  8.727 -1.936  10.663    13.258 14.532 12.648  1.884 
 [0.74]  [8.24]  [-2.27]  [7.72]    [53.87]  [46.74]  [53.11]  [7.32] 
High minus low  0.175  6.656 -1.832 8.488   0.083  0.898  -0.240  1.138 
  [0.16] [4.46] [-2.66] [4.54]    [0.52] [3.43] [-1.37] [3.69] 
  Panel C: excess returns (%)    Panel D: 4-factor Alpha (%) 
Low volume concentration   0.711 1.125 0.740 0.385    -0.008 0.329 -0.016 0.344 
  [3.10] [3.90] [3.12] [1.79]    [-0.08] [1.68] [-0.15] [1.52] 
High volume concentration   0.624 1.916 0.387  1.530   0.052  1.149 -0.247 1.396 
  [2.16] [5.39] [1.32] [6.34]    [0.53] [4.89] [-2.24] [5.41] 
High minus low  -0.093  0.792 -0.353 1.144   0.034  0.820  -0.231  1.051 
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Table A1: Distribution of earnings announcement dates by fiscal year, 1973-2004 
 
This table shows the distribution of earnings announcement dates for CRSP/COMPUSTAT stocks by fiscal year end month.  The 
earnings announcement represents the date in which quarterly earnings and earnings per share figures are first publicly reported in 
the various news media.  For every firm with a fiscal year ending in calendar month t, we report the fraction of announcements 
occurring in every calendar month in the period 1973 to 2004.  For each fiscal year end month, we report in bold the four calendar 
months with the highest number of announcements.   
 
 
  Fiscal year end month 
% of ann  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
Jan 0.05  11.57  16.29  0.21 10.22 16.07  0.05 13.18 16.96  4.70  14.96  8.63 
Feb 3.61  0.13  8.97  12.63  0.08 9.54  11.58 0.09 8.64  14.62  6.54  10.87 
Mar  14.82  3.33 0.02  12.29  16.25  0.09  14.08  14.61  0.17 11.10 16.34  3.65 
Apr 4.48  13.24  4.42 0.03 8.75  16.33  0.03 10.70 16.93  0.10 9.78  18.98 
May  18.18  6.24  12.53  3.21 0.01 9.48  12.38 0.35 8.50  15.28  0.11 6.61 
Jun 7.60  17.14  5.64  13.87  4.86 0.03  13.35  14.68  0.12 10.01 16.52  0.08 
Jul 0.04  8.47  17.15  6.30  12.64  4.62 0.04  10.22  17.36  0.13 8.56  19.17 
Aug  18.06  0.44 8.88  15.60  5.41  12.81  2.16 0.04 8.20  15.75  0.02 6.12 
Sep 7.57  15.32  0.10 10.00 17.31  4.95  12.33 2.52 0.05 9.39  15.52  0.12 
Oct 0.09  9.71  17.11  0.08 8.98  17.35  7.77  14.85  5.92 0.01 9.96  19.50 
Nov  17.33  0.62 8.87  13.79  0.06 8.64  12.85  5.51  12.51  3.11 0.12 6.22 
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Figure 1: The earnings announcement premium, 1927-2004 
 
This figure shows returns of the earnings premium portfolio.  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are 
assigned to one of two portfolios (expected announcers and expected non-announcers) using announcement 
predicted based on fiscal year end.  All stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are 
rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights.  The portfolios include all available stocks with four 
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Figure 2: excess returns and abnormal volume subsequent to announcement month, 1973–
2004 
 
This figure shows average abnormal return and average abnormal volume in month t+k of a portfolio of announcing stocks in 
month t. Abnormal return is defined as monthly return minus the average return of a portfolio of non announcers. We report 
average monthly abnormal volume (return) of a portfolio of announcers minus volume (return) of a portfolio of non-
announcers.  Scaled volume (SV) is defined as the ratio of share volume for firm j today to firm j's average monthly volume 
over the previous 12 months.  Abnormal volume (AV) is defined as scaled volume minus the equal weight average of scaled 
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Figure 3: CAR and volume around earnings announcements, 1973–2004 
 
This figure shows event–time daily cumulative abnormal return and cumulative turnover in trading day t+k for firms 
announcing earnings at date t.  Abnormal return is defined as daily return minus an equally weighted portfolio of 
non-announcing firms.  Scaled volume is defined as share volume in month t divided by average volume in the 
previous 250 trading days.  Abnormal volume is defined as scaled volume minus the equal weight average of scaled 
volume for all firms on that day.  This figure includes firms in the period 1973 – 2004 with market capitalization (as 
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Figure 4: Returns and volume sorted by prior volume concentration ratio. 
 
This figure shows event–time daily cumulative abnormal return and cumulative turnover in trading day t+k for firms 
announcing earnings at date t.  Abnormal return is defined as daily return minus an equally weighted portfolio of 
non (expected) announcing firms.  Abnormal return is defined as daily return minus an equally weighted portfolio of 
non-announcing firms.  Scaled volume is defined as share volume in month t divided by average volume in the 
previous 250 trading days.  Abnormal volume is defined as scaled volume minus the equal weight average of scaled 
volume for all firms on that day.  We cumulate by trading days to obtain cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) and cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAVs).  At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are 
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the volume concentration ratio defined as volume on the previous 16 
announcements months divided by the total volume in the previous 48 months.  We lagged volume concentration 3 
months.  This figure includes firms with market capitalization (as of the previous month) above the median market 
capitalization of CRSP firms.  We plot returns and volume for the top 20% high volume concentration ratio stocks 
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 Figure 5:  Order flow around announcements, 1993-2000 
 
This figure shows event–time daily abnormal order flow in trading day t+k for firms announcing earnings at date t.  
We split trades based on dollar value of the trade and compute a measure of trade-initiation which captures which 
side of the trade demands immediate execution.  Each trade on the TAQ tape as buyer or seller initiated using a 
procedure detailed in Lee and Ready (1991): a trade is classified as buyer initiated or seller initiated, respectively, if 
the trade price is above or below the quote midpoint of the most recent bid ask spread, or if the trade price is above 
or below the last executed trade price.  Small (large) trades are defines a trades less than $5,000 ($50,000).  For 
every stock and for each trade size bin we compute order imbalances (Net Buy) as the ratio buyer initiated volume 
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where BUY is total buyer initiated volume in day t (number of shares), SELL is total seller initiated volume, and 
VOL is daily volume.  We normalize Net Buy by subtracting from it the equal weighted average of Net Buy for all 
non-announcing firms that day.  This figure includes firms in the period 1993 to 2000 with market capitalization (as 
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Figure 6: Order flow sorted by prior volume concentration ratio, 1993–2000 
 
This figure shows event–time daily abnormal order flow in trading day t+k for firms announcing earnings at date t.  
We split trades based on dollar value of the trade and compute a measure of trade-initiation which captures which 
side of the trade demands immediate execution.  Each trade on the TAQ tape as buyer or seller initiated using a 
procedure detailed in Lee and Ready (1991): a trade is classified as buyer initiated or seller initiated, respectively, if 
the trade price is above or below the quote midpoint of the most recent bid ask spread, or if the trade price is above 
or below the last executed trade price.  Small (large) trades are defines a trades less than $5,000 ($50,000).  For 
every stock and for each trade size we compute order imbalances (Net Buy) as the ratio buyer initiated volume minus 
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where BUY is total buyer initiated volume in day t (number of shares), SELL is total seller initiated volume, and 
VOL is daily volume.  We normalize Net Buy by subtracting from it the equal weighted average of Net Buy for all 
non-announcing firms that day.  This figure includes firms with market capitalization (as of the previous month) 
above the median market capitalization of CRSP firms. We cumulate by trading days to obtain cumulative net buy.  
At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the volume 
concentration ratio defined as volume on the previous 16 announcements months divided by the total volume in the 
previous 48 months.  We lagged volume concentration 3 months.  This figure includes firms in the period 1993 to 
2000 with market capitalization (as of the previous month) above the median market capitalization of CRSP firms.  
We plot small order flow for the top 20% high volume concentration ratio stocks and the bottom 20% low volume 
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Appendix: fiscal year end method to predict announcements 
In this section we describe the algorithm used to forecast announcement months based on 
fiscal year end.  Table A1 shows the distribution of earnings announcement dates for 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT stocks by fiscal year end for the period 1973-2004.  For every firm with a 
fiscal year ending in calendar month t, we report the fraction of earning announcements 
occurring in every calendar month.  For each fiscal year end month, we highlight the four 
calendar months with the highest number of announcements.  For example: firm with a fiscal 
year ending in December tend to announce in February (10.87% of the total number of 
announcements), April (18.98%), July (19.17%) and October (19.5%).  Firms with a fiscal year 
ending in December tend to announce in March May, August and November, and so on. 
We compute expected announcement month as follows.  At the beginning of each 
calendar month t, we compute the frequency of announcements in table A1 using data available 
up to month t.  We assign each firms to one two portfolios: if calendar month t+1 matches any of 
four calendar months with the highest number of announcements corresponding to the firms’ 
fiscal year end month and we classify the firms as expected announcer in month t+1, provided 
that the firm did not have an announcement in month t.  If calendar month t+1 does not match 
any of the four calendar months with the highest number of announcements corresponding to the 
firms’ fiscal year end month, or the firms has an announcement in month t, we classify the firm 
as expected non-announcer in month t+1.  For example, based on the second row of table A1, on 
the last trading day of January 2005 we would classify firms with fiscal year end ending April, 
October and December that did not have an announcement in January 2005, as expected 
announcers in February 2005. 